debatessurroundingschoolcurriculaandthecollisionofreligionandevolution. 4 AsKurtDopfer recentlynoted,"[t]hepublicationofOntheOriginofSpeciesbyCharlesDarwinin1859setoffa paradigmaticearthquakeinthesciences,andtosomedegreeinsocietyatlarge." 5 Sincethen, evolutionaryconceptshavebeensuccessfullyapplied,refinedanddrawnupontoexplainlongterm developments and change in human relations, societies, culture, and civilization. In jurisprudence, authors like Henry Sumner Maine 6 and Oliver Wendell Holmes 7 have relied on evolutionary ideas for explaining the structures of change in the common law. Despite differences in opinion regarding the analogies between biological and legal evolution, legal scholars writing after Holmes generally acknowledged a degree of purpose in legal interpretation and statutory legislation: "A novel statute or precedent suggests […] variation (purposeful,perhaps,butstillvariation)inageneralflowofthingsinwhichthereisacontinuing responsetothecallofcircumstance-adjustmenttoenvironment.Thenatureoftheprocessis apttobeobservedbythatlackofperspectivewhichpreventsusfromseeingtheoldandthe new in their true relation. The legislator is not, as he may imagine himself, a Columbus. Not infrequently,heismerelymakingexplicitwhatwasreallyimplicitinpre-existinglaw."
8 Besides thisdistinctdisrespectoftheLegalRealistsforthecontentionthatjudgesweremerelyengaged in 'finding' the law', legal scholars quickly began to ascertain the relevance not only of comparative 9 butalsoofhistorical,detailedstudiesofdifferentlegalcultures,ifonewantedto makeanymoregeneralizableassertionsregardinglegalchange. 10 Meanwhile, in economic theory, Schumpeter's 11 emphasis on economic growth as the key to economicanalysishelpedpreparethegroundforevolutionarytheory,himselfharkeningback Evolution', (1918) 777 ; see the response of Keller's discussion of social and legal evolution by W. J. Brown, 'Law and Evolution', (1919) 29 Yale Law Journal 394-400, in particular 397, 398: "I think the term 'legal evolution' a useful and suggestive way of expressing some of the most fundamental characteristics of the long process involved in the history of law." onto Smith's inquiry into circumstances contributing to the particular dynamics of economic change in his time. 12 Subsequently, in particular Hayek's 1945 knowledge-based account of market processes 13 and Alchian's 1950 essay on 'Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory' 14 were among the first to pave the way for a promising promotion of evolutionary conceptsineconomics 15 ,withimportantparalleldevelopmentsinthenaturalsciences. 16 Aswe willdiscussbelow,evolutionarythinkinghascontinuedtoplayaparticularlyimportantrolein the development of more recent economic theorizing about economic growth and social change, in particular in its challenging the neo-classical economists, again, with Schumpeter soundingthebellsofattackearlyon. 17 Itwasaboveallthefocusonthedynamicsofeconomic change in contrast to the neoclassicals' focus on mechanics and to a model analysis of economic equilibria that would eventually open doors to the wealth of institutional and interdisciplinaryeconomicthinkingthatcharacterizestheworkbyscholarssuchasDouglassC. 14 A. A. Alchian, 'Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory', (1950) David, in this volume. as Nico Stehr and Volker Meja. 19 The 2009 award of the Nobel Prize in Economics to Williamson and Ostrom constitutes an important milestone in the evolution of economic and institutionalthoughtandinvitesustocastalightbackontothistheoreticaltracjectoryoverthe preceding decades, opening up an ample view of the manifold overlappings and reciprocal enrichmentsthathavebeenoccurringbetweeneconomicandlegaltheorizing.Suchattempts at mutual understanding and enrichment are certain to encounter numerous roadblocks and impasses, not least due to the co-evolutionary nature of the respective fields and their rationalities. 20 While the breathtaking ascendance of 'law and economics' 21 has irreversibly transformed both practice and theory of law, the economist's depiction of this alleged crossdisciplinary dialogue is as legendary 22 as the potential interdisciplinary dialogue between law andeconomicshasoftenbeenconfined. The project pursued in the present volume hopes to go beyond the 'law and economics' perspectivethathasbeensoimmenselyinfluentialinlegalpracticeandacademiabyfocusing onthedimensionofevolutionwithineachofthetwodisciplinesinordertocarveout,fromthat perspective, the possible future possibilities and directions of cross-disciplinary pollination betweenlegalandeconomicthinking.Withbothdisciplinesinherentlyaspiringtoconceptualize models, principles and systems of social order, the discovery of a dynamic dimension in the development of the respective apparatus could not come as a surprise: evidently, in both disciplines,lawandeconomics,differentideasofevolutionhavelonginspiredahostofvarying usagesandassessments. ,andsocialnorms. 30 Thisworkhasaltogethercontributed to the development of fairly robust assessments of the 'environment' of economic development drawing on a host of different disciplinary depictions of formal and informal institutions. 31 As powerfully illustrated by the recently again increased interest in 'informal rules'or,socialnorms,thereappearstobeasharedperceptionamongeconomistsandlawyers of how customs, social practices, indigenous norms challenge can fit into the description of legal enforcement mechanisms embedding an otherwise far-reaching system of social self-regulation,preciselybecausethe'legal'natureofthesesocialnormsisinquestion.Particularly in light of the work done by sociologists and lawyers regarding the changing nature of state regulation in the context of privatization of norm-creation and the delegation of law-making authority to private and quasi-public bodies 32 , economic theorizing has become increasingly sensitive to the unpacked assumptions relating to the desired stability of property rights enforcement 33 , with the more long-term consequences of this development and the more recent interest in the cognitive basis for individual choice-making 34 still to be assessed. What seems to be clear, however, is that both economists and legal scholars are hard at work at furtherscrutinizingthedynamicsoftheevolutionofbothformalandinformalrules,theformer beinginterestedtoalargedegreeinthechallengesofinformalrulestothedevisingofsound economicmodelsforemergingortransformingeconomies 35 ,whilethelatterareengagedina critiqueofthepoliticalnatureofsocialnorms. 36 II.MEANWHILE:ADVANCESINSOCIOLOGICALTHEORY,ECONOMICSANDLAW In many ways, these developments can be said to have their origin in theoretical advances made in sociology, economics and legal theory. As regards the first, in 1983, the German sociologistNiklasLuhmannpublishedwhatwouldsoonberegardedasaseminalwork:Social Systems.Inthisbook,LuhmannreconceptualizedTalcottParsons'theoryofsocialsystemson thebasisofthebiologicalconceptofautopoiesis. Luhmann'sconceptofevolution,whichconstituteda crucial element for his general theory of society, played a decisive role for law: by explaining how evolution occurred through an unending process of variation, selection and retention, Luhmannwasabletoprovideanintricablypersuasivemodelfortheexplanationoflegalchange -a model which was on the one hand extremely sensitive to the 'embeddedness' of law in social structures -much like the Realists had indeed seen it -but at the same time, emphasizinglaw'sparticularmodeofchange,adaptationandevolution.
39 Withviewtothefate of evolutionary theory in law, it is important to note, that legal theorists close to systems theory -such as Gunther Teubner 40 and Karl-Heinz Ladeur 41 -have always insisted on a particular, critical distance to social theories of law's embeddedness on the one hand and to theoriesofthe 'unityoflaw' 42 ontheother,whilecertainlyengagingwiththesameconceptual challenges -concerning the relationship between law and society -that these theories were facing. Over time, these explorations have contributed to a considerably rich landscape of conceptual and theoretical assessments of law's evolutionary trends and prospects -studies thateventuallyreceivedimportantimpulsesfrombothcomparativelegalscholarship 42 See, for example, the work by M. Baldus, Die Einheit der Rechtsordnung. Bedeutungen einer juristischen Formel in Rechtstheorie, Zivil-und Staatsrechtswissenschaft des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts (Duncker & Humblot, 1995) 51 Attheheartoftheirconcept of the firm as operating within a particular environment was the idea that it would be impossibletodescribethedynamicsofchangeofinter-organizationaldecisionswithouttaking into account the manifold input and output relations between the firm and its -constantly changing 52 -environment.ThiscontentionstillliesatthebaseofNelson'sandWinter'stheory today: "At the broadest level, and possibly the deepest, the difference between evolutionary economic theory that is taking shape, and the neoclassical theory that has dominated microeconomic theorizing over the last thirty years, is that evolutionary theory sees the economyasalwaysintheprocessofchange,witheconomicactivityalmostalwaysproceeding inacontextthatisnotcompletelyfamiliartotheactors,orperfectlyunderstoodbythem. 65 Theimportanceofthisresearchliesinitsuntiring-ifvaried-engagementwith the tension between market and non-market regulation, a tension which powerfully unfolds from within the definition of 'institutions'. In Professor North's words, "Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (laws, property rights). 66 In his important study of 1990, he observed: "As defined here, they [institutions] therefore are the framework within human interaction takes place." 67 It is against this relatively flexible definition that North has been arguing for the central role of institutions for long-term economic performance. North's contribution to an increasingly interdisciplinary dialogue concerning market regulation in historicalperspectivecanhardlybeoverestimated.Asacademicinterestinthenature,culture and trajectory of the market 68 among legal scholars, economists, economic historians, geographers and political economists again soared in recent years 69 , Douglass North's insistenceonaninterdisciplinary,historicallygroundedanalysisofthedifferentinstitutionsthat structure market behavior proved to be a crucial contribution to a more engaged and more challenging exchange between scholars in different disciplines. Building on and eventually substantively expanding his earlier interest in 'institutions' per se, North in his more recent work has adopted a decidedly social-theory perspective, from which he places a central emphasisonthenatureandvolatilityofsocietalchangeandontheresultinguncertainty,that characterizes long-term oriented theorizing. Central to this reorientation is the role of intentionality with regard to institutional change. areamongthemostsophisticatedandmostpromisingeconomistcontributionsto an integrated analysis of economic developments. It is in fact on the basis of and in engagement with the wealth and the challenging, analytical potential of the institutionalist framework that other disciplines such as political economy, economic sociology, economic geographyand,certainly,lawhavebeendevelopingoverthepastdecades.Thiscontextmakes for an intriguing moment to engage in an interdisciplinary analysis of the evolutionary trajectoriesoflawandeconomics.Theproffereddepictions,explanationsandassessmentsas theyarevoicedwithregardtothe2007/2008financialandeconomiccrisis,notonlybythose who had always 'known', 'warned' or were 'ignored', feed into and complement what will continue to unfold as a crucially important theoretical engagement with the models and toolkits economists, lawyers and social theorists have been relying on since the early 1980s. 79 See, e.g., the definition of 'institution' provided by Nee and Swedberg, op. cit., [797] [798] : "An institution may be conceptualized as a dominant system of interrelated informal and formal elements -customs, shared beliefs, norms, and rules -which actors orient their actions to when they pursue their interests. In this view, institutions are dominant social structures which provide a conduit for social and collective action by facilitating and structuring the interests of actors and enforcing principal agent relationships. It follows from this interest-related definition that institutional change involves not simply remaking the formal rules, but requires the realignment of interests, norms, and power." Whiletheneedforaninterdisciplinaryandintegratedstudyofthecurrentcrisisthusliesinthe evident ambiguity of the very starting points of any assessment 83 , the promise of an interdisciplinary study of institutions goes further still: precisely because of the distinct premisesandnormativeorientationsinlegalandeconomicthinking,thereisagreatneedfor continued translation of methodological approaches in both disciplines. 84 The by itself is about as explanatory or illuminating as the claim that market failures challenge the embedding legal enforcement system in a straight-forward, causal manner 93 : "Fromtheforegoingitmaybeseenthataproperunderstandingofpath-dependence,andof thepossibilitiesofexternalitiesleadingtomarketfailure,isnotwithoutinterestingimplications foreconomicpolicy.Butthosearenotatallthesortsofglibconclusionsthatsomecriticshave alleged must follow if one believes that history really matters -namely, that government shouldtrytopickwinnersratherthanletmarketsmakemistakes.Quitethecontrary…. […] .One thing that public policy could do is to try to delay the market from committing to the future inextricably, before enough information has been obtained about the likely technical or organizational and legal implications, of an early, precedent-setting decision." 94 In another paper, David observed that " [I] f there are ways thus to represent the coevolution of microeconomic behavior with regard to technology choices (technical standardization), or conformancewithsocialnorms(customandconvention)andcorrelatedpatternsofideologyor beliefs carrying normative force (subjective conformism), the explanatory apparatus available to economists studying long-term trends in technology and social institutions will surely be much more powerful." 95 As pointed out by Duncan Kennedy, in a comment on Robert Clark, 'costs' are a merely allusive concept, that can hardly carry enough weight on their own to identify or even justify action on the part of a public or private actor. 96 Tightly connected to Democracy. Obliquely', (1995) 28 Political Science and Politics 684-688, 685: "Market rules do not permit one simply to appropriate what one wants. Appropriating another person's labor we call slavery, and appropriating assets we call theft. Nor do market rules provide any social instrument for collective reassignment of claims."
suchanobservationisDavid'sowncontentionthatwemustapplyamuchmoredifferentiated tool-kittoexploretheinteractionbetweendifferentmarketactorsovertimeinordertogeta betterunderstandingofwhythingsgowrongandhowwearriveatsuchanassessment.What emerges from Professor David's observations is a cautionary approach towards a concept of market failure that is not again re-embedded in a comprehensive historical and systematic institutionalstudy.'Historymatters',then,isnotasophisticatedenoughproposaltoengagein a layered, interdisciplinary analysis of how which institutions play a crucial role in the organization of today's market economies. While the concept of path dependency has been developed primarily with confined, nationally grown markets in mind, its relevance for transnational markets and transnational regulatory theory follows from the realization of the stickinessofexisting(andnewlycreated)regulatorystructures,somethingwhich-asbeforein the case of lex mercatoria 97 -any globally or transnationally aspiring regulatory concept will necessarilyhavetotakeintoaccount. 98 Bynot,however,being abletoanswerwhetherthelegalsystempredates-historicallyornormatively-theeconomic system, the economic story of markets and their embeddedness in a legal enforcement mechanism remains on a purely abstract level: it distinguishes between the market and the statebyresortingtotermssuchasmarketandnon-marketordermechanisms.This,however, attemptstoanswerthequestionastowhatconstitutestherelationbetweenthetwospheres withoutprovidingforadefinitionoforajustificationofthedistinctioninthefirstplace.That thelegalsystemexiststoremedymarketfailuresdoesnotexplainwhetherthemarketfailureis infactsomethingelsethanapoliticalor,regulatoryfailure. 113 Itishere,wheretheevolutionary strandsinlaw,economicsandsociologyhavemuchtocontribute.
IV.TOWARDSARENEWEDINTERDISCIPLINARYPERSPECTIVE

V.CONCLUSION:LEGALANDECONOMICGOVERNANCEOFTHETRANSNATIONAL KNOWLEDGESOCIETY
that, in fact, 'We are all Economists Now' 115 , but that we seem to now be experiencing yet anotherrelativizationofperspective.Apronouncementofthesort'WeareallInterdisciplinary Governance scholars now', would, however, have only a faint ring to it. The underlying conundrumisthatofthetrajectoriesofinstitutionalandnormativechange,whichoccupymuch ofeconomicandlegalinquiry,beforeandinlightoftheglobalfinancialandeconomiccrisisof [2007] [2008] [2009] . Meanwhile, the intellectual competition over the primacy of economic or legal reasoningintheimaginationof('sustainable','good','just')governanceoccursintheshadowof adramatictransformationofthespacesforeconomicandlegalordering.Preciselyatamoment wherelegalscholars,politicalscientistsandsociologistshavecometoacceptthetransnational challenge to the traditional concepts of law and legal regulation 116 , also the economists' ascriptiontolaw,thestateandtothecorrelationbetweenthetwoasconstitutingtherelevant enforcement framework for economic action needs to be revisited. It is here where we can identifyanurgentneedbutalreadypromisingcontoursofaninterdisciplinaryinquiryintothe nature of 'institutions' of economic and legal governance. Much seems to be at stake: as a utopiaoftransnationalgovernancecontinuestolingeratthehorizonoflibertarianimaginations of globally integrated markets, neither discipline appears yet to have an appropriate governance theory at hand. The space of human interaction and of regulation beyond the nationstatecanbedepictedeitherastheWildWestofunrestrainedindividualliberty,orasan extremelyfragileandcontestedspaceofstrugglesoverrecognition,politicsandcommunity. 117 In the face of this, has 'law lost its lieu?" 118 Is the 'Global Bukowina', which inspired legal sociologistsattherespectivebeginningsandendsofthetwentiethcentury,arealmoflaw,of socialnormsorofeconomicliberties? 119 Whatarewetomakeofthesedistinctions,afterall? To be sure, this process does not continue in a quiet state of contentment and wonder, but rather in surprise, happenstance and terror. 120 We understand concurring work on 'global governance'toprovideanimportantcontributiontoamoreadequateanalysisofthepressing understoodonlyasarestlesssearchforsociallyadequateself-descriptions,"catastrophesand thechangeinsocialstructuresleadtoaruiningofsemantics. 128 Communication,then,fromthe perspective of systems theory, constituting the semantics of the particular observing systems such as law, politics, economics and others, is, in the context of fiercely competing 'truth' claims brought forward from different social rationalities, inevitably thrown back onto itself. Thelegalsystemmust-andwill-processthechangeinitsenvironmentbyrelyingonitsvery own available operations 129 that now will follow into the depths of societal differentiation to focusonwhatMarianaValverdereferstoasthesmall'T'sincomparisontothelarge'T'ina searchfortruthfulness. 130 Thesameideaappliestoothersocialsystemsaswell,astherecent theorizing over 'institutional diversity' amply illustrates. 131 Taken together, we are left with contradicting impressions of a world falling apart, of reference systems eroding, on the one hand, and of interdisciplinary enrichment, inspiration and emerging understandings on the other.
This volume accepts this apparent contradiction by bringing together research from different fields and with different perspectives on the problem of institutional evolution. The basis for this volume was an interdisciplinary research project on Law, the State and Evolutionary Theory,jointlyconductedbytheCollaborativeResearchCenterTransformationsoftheStateat the University of Bremen (Germany) 132 and the German Law Journal. 133 In addition to work developedinthiscontext,thepresentvolumecontainsanumberofchaptersbysomeofthe most prominent evolutionary theory scholars working today. The collection thus aims at providing a reference point for scholars from different traditions and different fields for an inquiryintothemeaningandpromisesofevolutionarytheoryforfuturetheorizingaboutlegal and economic governance. The authors contributing to this volume specifically employ evolutionary theory in order to explore the challenges arising from the fundamental transformation of statehood that has been so powerfully captured by Saskia Sassen as an erosionofstatesovereigntybothfrom'below',broughtaboutbyprocessesofprivatizationand emerging forms of public-private governance, and from 'above,' through processes of transnationalizationofcollaborative,regulatorygovernance. 134 
